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| The Evolution of Mind. Oxford, Eng.: Oxford University Press.|
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1 EDITOR’S NOTE: In this book, the term 'narrow evolutionary psychology' signifies the approach to evolutionary psychology developed by Cosmides, Tooby, Buss, et al. This term was chosen not to imply that this approach has an inappropriately narrow point of view, but merely to suggest that the approach adopts a narrower range of assumptions than 'broad evolutionary psychology' (or, just 'evolutionary psychology'). This latter term signifies evolutionary psychology generally, practiced with any of a very broad range of assumptions possible within the general framework of evolutionary approaches to psychology. For more detail on this terminology, see the editor’s introduction, p 1
2 There is an obvious concern that “background knowledge” about humanity will too often take the form of crackpot biases and vested interests. This is an entirely general worry about the behavioral sciences, which we should certainly take seriously. The only direct response I can think of is to rigorously test the predictions that are generated. As time goes by we can hope that better theories will lead to better background knowledge.
3The same point can be made about similarities between adaptationist reasoning and reasoning in the social sciences. Economists, for example, often explain behavior via models that appear to attribute an implausible amount of knowledge about the economy or one’s psychology or future habits. These models are defended on the grounds that they should be judged by their consequences rather than their assumptions. This point about modeling is germane to adaptationist models too and is another instance of the way in which arguments about evolutionary reasoning are continuous with wider scientific methodology. Methods should be judged across the board, not singled out for ridicule in one context.
4Replying to a question on this point following a talk at Rutgers, Pinker argued that although we can do lots of things with our hands, they are in fact adapted for one function - manipulation (as opposed to the hands of Australopithecines, which were adaptations for tree-climbing). This is not a good response, though, because a foe of modularity could suggest, by parity of reasoning, that if our multi-purpose hands are adaptations for manipulation, then our brains are adaptations for learning, and although we can learn lots of things with them, that does not add up to their having numerous different special functions. This exchange shows that the physiology-psychology analogy is probably no use at all, as well as reinforcing how hard it is to establish just what a domain is, such that a module can be specific to one.
Steven J. Scher & Frederick Rauscher (eds.). Evolutionary Psychology: Alternative Approaches, 161-184 © 2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands