This text is free, but is still protected by U. S. and international copyright law. You are bound to these terms of usage




Скачать 372.41 Kb.
НазваниеThis text is free, but is still protected by U. S. and international copyright law. You are bound to these terms of usage
страница1/11
Дата конвертации04.02.2013
Размер372.41 Kb.
ТипДокументы
  1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10   11
Beyond

Description


Paul Knierim


© 2004 by Paul Knierim


This text is free, but is still protected by U.S. and international copyright law. You are bound to these terms of usage:


In order to reprint any partial section of Beyond Description, you must contact admin@philosophyforums.com and describe the usage you intend. In most cases you will be allowed to use sections of the text, but proper crediting will be required and the author must formally approve your usage.


In order to reprint the complete text of Beyond Description within a larger volume of work you must also contact admin@philosophyforums.com to make arrangements.


You cannot make any alterations to the text without acquiring express permission from the author.


You may redistribute this PDF file freely to anyone, so long as it is not altered and you do not present it as though it were your own creation.


Express your opinion on this book, any issues touched on in it, or any other aspects of philosophy, by registering free at http://www.philosophyforums.com.


Acknowledgments


The ideas which follow here could never have been as fully developed without the feedback of the members at philosophyforums.com. Special thanks to Distortion and Sharif.


Preface

"Experience may be regarded as a combination of self and environment, it being part of the problem to disentangle these two interacting components. Life, religion, knowledge, truth are all involved in this problem, some relating to the finding of ourselves, some to the finding of our environment from the experience confronting us. All of us in our lives have to make something of this problem; and it is an important condition that we who have to solve the problem are ourselves part of the problem."

- Sir Arthur Eddington 1


The entanglement of self and environment described by Eddington is perhaps the most fundamental issue of philosophy. This problem of experience has typically been approached by choosing one side or the other -- environment over self or self over environment -- or by declaring the two sides irrevocably separated and abandoning the project of a unified view of the world. Idealists favor the self over the environment, physicalists favor the environment over the self, while dualists say the two are forever partitioned off from each other by a metaphysical brick wall. The popularity of these approaches is likely due to the prevailing sense that they are the only possible options. This in turn may be due to a feeling that a solution which does not lay out the nature of things in a plainly describable way using the conventional tools of comparison and contrast is unsatisfying, obscure, or even an evasion. Neutral monism has often been dismissed on these grounds by proponents of the three more popular positions.

The best known defenses of a neutral monist point of view are Kant (whose neutral monism consists of the pairing of transcendental idealism and empirical realism) and Wittgenstein. Bertrand Russell’s logical atomism is officially a form of neutral monism as well, but what made Russell attractive to many was also what made him wrong: he asserted that the fundamental ‘stuff’ of the world could be described in a plain and comprehensible way, even if the form of the description would be a logical form rather than mind or matter. Wittgenstein hacked away at Russell’s flaws, creating a more honestly neutral form of monism which did not spend its time chasing after the mythical ultimate constituent of things.

Between Kant and Wittgenstein, the most painfully obvious similarity is that both are among the driest, most detail-oriented philosophers who seemingly have very little interest in making themselves comprehensible to anyone who does not already agree with them. Neither Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason nor Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus is a text particularly accessible to the average reader. Neither text intends to be, as both authors seek to complete philosophy rather than introduce it. Kant once commented that he believed he could’ve made himself much more readable if he had sought only to introduce the concepts, but he made no apologies for his detail and complexity in attempting to work through to the solution of the problems of metaphysics and epistemology. Wittgenstein, in his introduction to the Tractatus, asserts that his highly compressed several dozen pages solve everything of importance in philosophy... he makes no apologies for his formalistic approach, since to him this sort of formalism is in itself the essence of the solution to philosophy. Both authors felt that when their book was written everything of central importance to philosophy was completed.

A “Neutral Monism for Dummies” text seems unlikely to be rolling off the presses anytime soon. There is nevertheless a middle ground full of fertile land which has yet to be developed. The underlying concepts and methods of neutral monism can be explored and justified without attempting to solve every problem in the history of philosophy with a rigorous logical proof. There are many major issues which we will come to see in a clearer light, and the ability of neutral monism to demystify these issues is part of the justification for neutral monism itself; however, it is not wise to dwell on individual details in every case.

The content of this book might be summarized by a simple argument for which each chapter could be viewed as either justifying the premises or exploring the consequences of accepting the argument. This is the basic argument:

1 - If something has no properties, it cannot be described.

2 - Anything which has no components has no properties.

3 - Thus if something has no components, it cannot be described.

4 - In view of point 3: Any metaphysical or epistemological system which claims that a particular component/property is the ultimate irreducible constituent of everything, but which then offers a description of that irreducible constituent, is illogical and must be dismissed as a false system.

The possibility of describing brute-fact properties is at the heart of the issue. If there must be an ultimate component, something which everything else could be chopped into but which can’t be chopped up itself, the issue is what we could ever possibly be justified in saying about that component. If we cannot attribute any qualities to it, since all qualities are built out of it, then most of what we can say about it is what it isn’t rather than what it is. (It might be argued that when there’s nothing positive to say about it there’s no sense in claiming that it exists at all, but this is a not something we need worry about at the moment.)

Although we’ll first explore it from a metaphysical viewpoint, this issue drives into the central conflicts of epistemology as well. Just as metaphysics asserts physical or mental properties as brute facts to claim that there are describable but irreducible things which build everything else, there’s a similar tendency in epistemology. Brute truths are used to claim that there are describable but irreducible truths which everything else in our system must be built from. This is foundationalism, the belief that all of knowledge is a structure built out of simple but describable foundational truths. If we reject the idea of foundational properties in metaphysics, we must also drop if from our epistemology... in considering this, we must evaluate where it will leave us if we do drop our foundational framework.

One of the major issues running throughout the book is the difference between the empirical and the objective. This is the difference between what it’s like to be in contact with something (regardless of the method of detection or representation) and what the thing actually is independent from how things in contact with it react to it. The empirical is an objective being’s personal interpretation of the world as provided by its senses and devices. Concepts which apply in one of these contexts may not apply in the other, and quite often our confusion and misapplications are due to not recognizing the differences between the two contexts. We must step back and evaluate each philosophical question separately for how it applies to the objective world compared to how it applies to the empirical world. A conclusion from one context should not sway us toward a similar conclusion in the other context; however, we will find that the objective results help us understand certain limitations of our empirical results, and the empirical results provide us a method of approach for abstracting towards the objective results.

It may seem odd that the word ‘objective’ is continually used here to mean something beyond objects. It’s understandable that some may wish to only use ‘objective’ within the confines of the subject-object distinction, thus restricting it to what a conscious subject is in a relationship with. Kant took that alternative approach, and so what’s called objective here is what Kant would prefer to term transcendental. And yet ‘objective’ is a word commonly used to imply the ultimate state of things when the bias of being a particular subject is removed, and the usage in this text is consistent with that common implication of the word. As well, Kant’s own term ‘intersubjective’ already covers what Kant means by ‘objective,’ and so there’s little point in duplication. Objectivity is non-subjectivity... this holds true for the usage of the word in this text, but not for Kant as Kant’s objectivity is simply an unbiased subjectivity.

In the end, terminology serves a single purpose: the evocation of understanding. To create clarity with a single word is impossible. Attempting to hold a complex meaning in a single word often results in spillage and destruction when the original inventor’s intended context is replaced with the preconceptions of the rest of the community. A Kant-sized lexicon of new terms may be intended to clarify meaning and prevent misinterpretations, but often has the opposite effect when readers come to different interpretations of the meaning of each of the new terms. It seems best to try to stick with existing language as often as possible, where all the words are used enough by the community that at least a general sense of their meaning can be relied on as being understood by all. The more precise meanings of any word are determined by their context -- there is no single definition of anything, no solid foundations of language, only a floating agreement which we confirm or modify by continual usage in various contexts. We are well served to not assume our words will be understood individually, and to make careful efforts to clarify their meaning through continual usage. Philosophy is by its nature abstract, and this makes stipulation of terms a thousand fold more dangerous. The further a word is from experiential reinforcement, the more doomed it is to set itself adrift in a void of meaning or become caught in circular meaning.

Wittgenstein makes this comment on language: "Language disguises thought. So much so, that from the outward form of the clothing it is impossible to infer the form of the thought beneath it, because the outward form of the clothing is not designed to reveal the form of the body, but for entirely different purposes." Descriptions are linguistic. The physical world is itself a sort of language, the language of perception. The mental world is also a language, the language of introspection. Moving beyond description is moving beyond the use of language on itself and seeking the roots of what language means to point us to.

In every day life, when we say something is beyond description we tend to mean that it’s so overwhelming that it must be experienced in order to be understood. “It’s beyond description” translates as “you could never understand it without being in the experience yourself.” The transcending of description in philosophy is not very different. To move beyond description is to take the experience as being the experience, instead of applying concepts to it.

In one sense perhaps we can never go entirely beyond description, though we can approach the boundaries by defocusing. In another sense, however, we are always beyond description. All descriptive processes in our minds are part of experience, and the experience as a whole is beyond the descriptions which exist within it.


1: Eddington, A.S. (1928) The Nature of the Physical World. MacMillan, New York.


Existence

Something exists. This something is not any particular thing, but rather thingness in general. That it exists is simply definition; it picks out no thing in the world and is not to be explained in terms of any other facts.

Looking up at the sky on a clear night, gazing out into the enormity of space, we may ask ourselves why the universe should exist at all. We may ponder the idea that there could have been no universe, and instead only a pure nothingness pervading a lack of anywhere. We ask a simple question which seems profound to us: ‘Why is there something, rather than nothing?’ With this question we aren’t asking why there’s a particular item instead of a lack of that item, instead what we’re questioning is why there is existence in general rather than nonexistence. We’re asking why the nature of things is a state of somethingness rather than a state of nothingness.

The question of why there’s somethingness rather than nothingness rests on mistaken assumptions. To expect that existence needs explanation is to presume that nothingness is a more natural state of affairs. The favored position of nothingness is psychologically powerful, but has no objective justification. To say that nothingness is more basic than somethingness implies some possibility of standing outside of both being and non-being to say ‘there is x amount of somethingness and y amount of nothingness.’ If this were possible, it would be possible to find that the amount of nothingness is more than the amount of somethingness, or that the somethingness is sitting on top of the nothingness depending on it, and perhaps this would justify the claim that nothingness is more natural than somethingness.

Inside a heavily guarded experimental research laboratory, a sign on a door reads “Keep Out: Nothing is being researched inside.” Ignoring the warning, we venture into the room and find every imaginable piece of equipment hard at work in the research. In the doorway, a motion detector is set to trigger an alarm if nothing attempts to pass it. In one corner of the room we find a scale with nothing on it. Next to it is a pressure chamber subjecting nothing to intense atmospheric pressure. Further over is an electron microscope, carefully focused on nothing. On a desk sits an unplugged computer which takes nothing as input and uses nothing as a processor and produces nothing as output. With nothing heralding his arrival, a scientist walks into the room and with a gleeful expression exclaims, “At last, I’ve devised a foolproof method for figuring out what nothing is like!” He drinks a potion and promptly vanishes, leaving nothing behind as a trace.

To say that there’s more nothingness than there is somethingness would implicitly treat nothingness as itself a something. Where there’s a measurement, there’s something being measured. To say there’s a volume or other sort of quantity of nothingness would be to quantify that which is defined as being lack of quantity. There can be no quantities of nothing, and thus somethingness is not opposed to anything. The implicit treatment of nothingness as a something betrays the inescapable nature of somethingness which makes it more basic than nothingness -- the concept of nothingness can only be derived out of somethingness, whereas the concept of somethingness could never be derived out of nothingness. Not only is there no reason to anoint nothingness as the default state of things, there’s considerable reason to admit the unchallenged reign of somethingness.

In dismissing nothingness from its pedestal above somethingness, it may seem as though we leave the concept as a great mystery. We’re too familiar and comfortable with using the term to be willing to simply dismiss the concept out of hand as a mistake, and so we demand to know what it means and what it is for. This is a reasonable request, which is answered by explaining that nothingness has two valid senses of meaning.

The first sense of nothingness is the sense of reduction to a limit. An idea of nothingness can be arrived at by chipping away at something, reducing size further and further. In the reduction of something, the mind of the observer creates an idea of an infinite reduction by imagining the process being continued. A reduction far beyond what we can see, imagined to be carried out forever, creates the concept of a nothing. Nothingness is thus the limit which the infinite reduction of a thing approaches. In this way it’s the counterpart of infinity, the inverse of infinity. We must, however, be careful to understand the proper scope of this idea of infinite reduction. If we presume conservation of matter-energy, the sense of reduced being is never anything beyond a selection effect of the mind. We individuate a particular object and lose track of bits of it which are rearranged into surrounding material. If we were to remain aware of the other bits, we would see a change of form but no reduction. Burning a piece of paper reduces it to nothing, we say, simply because what’s left at the end is no longer paper. We have never encountered any reduction of the general matter-energy somethingness of the universe, only the reduction of particular things. Similarly we have never encountered any increase in somethingness, only increases in particular things. From this we have a meaningful concept of nothingness for particular things as particular things are labeled by us, but no justification for applying such a concept to thingness in general or the universe as a whole. This is why it’s reasonable to ask why the thunderstorm overhead exists instead of nothing (by which we mean to ask why things are arranged in this form instead of in a way we would not notice), but not reasonable to ask why the universe as a whole exists instead of nothing.

Another distinct sense of nothingness is the sense of logical exclusion. Nothingness is that which cannot obtain. “P and not P” is nothingness. Anything which is equivalent to “P and not P,” expressed in any form, is also nothingness. This nothing is that which we’ve determined inconsistent and cannot admit to our consideration. As with the first sense of nothing, it fails to imply a nothing of the sort which can have objective meaning. The logically excluded isn’t possible, and so it isn’t real. The concept is used in order to label something as a mistake (a thought process gone wrong) and thus it applies to processes of the mind rather than the world in itself. Looking out at the world, when we encounter a contradiction we can surmise that it comes from a mistake of our own judgment rather than from the world itself.

We may like to think back to the big bang, if we suppose it to be the beginning of time, and say, ‘before that, there was nothing.’ This is the logical exclusion sense of nothingness. To say that there was not any thing is to say that talking of it or portraying it as meaningful is mistaken. When we say there was nothingness before the big bang, we mean that to utter “before the big bang” is as meaningful as to utter “when both p and not p.” Calling it nothing is a way of pointing out that our tendency to want to imagine there was a time leading up to it is a mistake.

With a firm grasp on nothing we may return again to something. With its proposed counterpart limited to particular things and rendered irrelevant to the context of the universe taken as a whole, somethingness sits alone in a barren and featureless space searching frantically for a mirror. It finds none, nor does it find any new playmates with which to compare itself through interaction. The only possible method it has left to describe itself is to reflexively reference itself. When an item can only sit and helplessly reference itself, it has been stripped of all content and the truth value of it is reduced to definition.

When someone asks us what the intrinsic nature of somethingness is, we have no meaningful reply to give beyond noting that it contains all things. We cannot describe features of somethingness unless we can find something with which to compare or contrast it.


Matter


One significant attempt at describing somethingness is the concept of matter. Matter was once said to consist of tiny points of mass, solid objects which could not be broken down any further. These tiny objects were called atoms, borrowing the term used by the Greek atomists who first suggested indestructible yet mobile parts as making up the world. Newton described the atom as being matter shaped into hard, impenetrable, moveable particles. These atoms were thought to allow true description of the intrinsic nature of matter, and matter in turn was held up as the somethingness of the world.

We step back in time to the Victorian era, into a university classroom.

“Let me describe the atom,” the professor offers. “It is a very small solid object. Imagine a tiny billiard ball, something which is featureless but embodies materiality. It is the foundation stone of the universe and the very definition of solidity.”

He holds up a billiard ball, painted entirely black, to illustrate. “You cannot break this apart. It has no components of any sort, because it is the ultimate compactor of mass. It exists in space and moves around in space, interacting with other such identical atoms. The world consists of an unimaginable number of these things bumping into each other... and when they bump, the perfect solidity of each means that they will never be even scratched and will bounce off each other again and again in patterns which make the larger structures we know. This table in front of me is hard because it has these hard atoms densely packed inside it... the air we breathe is soft because it has so few atoms thinly spread. This is the intrinsic nature of matter. This is how the world works.”

An inherent problem of what this description attempts to do can be drawn out by considering the purpose of the idea of an atom. People observe macro-objects through their senses, and find these objects to have complex properties. One thing feels heavy, another thing feels light, another looks dark and sounds cavernous. We wish to explain these sensory properties in terms of something simpler, so that we may discover what causes the sensations to be as they are. Darkness is explained by the absence of electromagnetic radiation of the visible wavelength, and the cavernous sound is explained by an interference pattern of particles hitting off distant walls before entering our ears. In modern times we would never think to explain the nature of darkness by referring to ‘dark radiation,’ nor would we explain the nature of cavernous sounds by reference to ‘cavernous sounding particles’; yet in the Victorian atomist theory the atoms themselves embody the same qualities as the macro-world which they’ve been invented to explain. With such a theory, sensory observations are explained away in terms of the very features of sensory observations. Solidity is explained by reference to solid stuff being densely packed, clearly leaving us no closer at all to an understanding of what solidity means.

A fundamental mistake of this sort of atomist view is the belief that something can be described which does not consist of any parts. The mistake is not to say that there is something which is indestructible... that is an empirical question which remains to be answered. It’s description without comparison which results in a paradox: by this view there is nothing which is not an atom, and yet it’s held as being meaningful to describe the features of an atom. Unless there is some object which is not made of atoms, we can make no sense of a description of the intrinsic features all atoms share.

Matter-energy duality provides another line of defense for those who wish to say that matter can be described. We could suppose that if matter and energy were intrinsically distinct sorts of things they could give each other description via contrast. We would at least be able to say that matter is the exclusion of energy, and energy the exclusion of matter. Since the advent of relativity theory in the early twentieth century, it has been demonstrated that there is no such intrinsic difference of nature. Previous arguments had rested on the presumed truths of the laws of conservation of matter and conservation of energy, which if they had held true could have indicated a distinction between the nature of matter and energy. These laws proved false, however, with only the replacement law of the conservation of matter-energy holding true... this combined law is a clear indication that matter and energy are objectively the same type of thing. The collapse of matter-energy duality is described by Einstein’s famous equation E=MC². Since we can now convert matter into energy and energy into matter, we know that their fundamental natures are not exclusive. We may describe any quantity of energy as being the product of a mass and the square of the speed of light, and any quantity of mass as being a quantity of energy divided by the square of the speed of light. Gone is any justification for matter and energy being distinct realms, as both can be considered as coded ways of speaking of each other. In order to have the contrast for matter which we would require in order to describe the somethingness of the universe, we must be able to come up with an example of something which is not another way of expressing matter itself.

Modern scientific views no longer attempt to attribute phenomenological properties to the fundamental particles. Quantum mechanics signaled the end of designating solidity as an objective concept. Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle turns the notion of exact location into a choice of either having a vague region or a vague momentum for the particle... position and momentum are recognized as necessarily connected concepts at this level, despite our intuitions to the contrary. This leaves it impossible to describe the fundamental particles in terms of our own familiar world. Quantum tunneling is the final death of solidity’s fundamental status and objectivity, as it reduces the solid or porous nature of things to terms of interacting probability fields.

Consider a quantum mechanical game of baseball. The pitcher winds up and tosses a slow and straight pitch directly down the middle. The batter takes a perfect swing, and the bat lines up squarely into position to hit the ball at the perfect time. We pause the universe for a moment here to inspect the situation. We carefully inspect the location of the bat and ball, and note that they’re just now coming into contact with one another. We can assure ourselves that if not a home run this will at least be a hard line drive. Now we resume the universe, and to our amazement the ball goes directly through the bat and on into the catcher’s mitt. The disgusted batter turns around and tells the umpire that this was impossible. Always prepared, the umpire pulls out his rule book and reads from it: “Rule 3.2.7: Quantum Tunneling. If a material object shall hit another material object, it is entirely possible -- although highly improbable -- for them to pass through each other with no effects.” Another side effect of this rule is that the ball could have gone on through the catcher and umpire without harming them at all. A bullet could be fired directly through a person’s head and come out on the other side without leaving a scratch, although we’d need to either repeat the experiment for trillions of years or encounter exceptional luck.

The umpire’s rule is somewhat deceptive in that it maintains the fictitious distinction between material objects and probability fields. Material objects are no longer anything more than interacting probability fields, under this quantum mechanical interpretation. Everything which is material consists of a probability of encountering it within a region.

Matter is no longer described as having features other than the relations of what it’s composed of as affected by (or in alternate phrasing, as reflected in) the geometry of space-time and the fundamental forces. The question of if there’s an ultimate particle which every other particle is made of but which is not made of any particles itself is an open question, but certainly such a particle will not have any of the features of macroscopic reality. If a superstring may be considered the modern actor playing the part of unbreakable atom, it’s worth noting that the string is little more than a word to unify a pile of equations and descriptions attempted of it are no more than metaphors to summarize the equations. It has no solidity or density or mass or extension or duration. Properties familiar to us as physical reality, and even space-time, are the result of massless excitations of the superstring rather than a part of its composition. Everything which we call a particle is nothing more than a system of logical relations. The canvas cannot be described except as the relations of what is on it.

Matter itself has been reduced to mathematics and statistics. The most distinctive characteristic we might note of equations is that equations do not have intrinsic features to be described. Being abstracted representations of relationships, they’re the descriptors of content rather than describable as having content of their own. For this reason, taking the equations which modern physics identifies as matter to be the somethingness of the universe will allow us to describe individual things (via using the equations) but never allow us any description of the general somethingness itself.

Fed up with the claim that the nature of matter cannot be described, the common sense objector may rightly point out that we can give a description of matter by saying that matter is a relation of mass, momentum and stress. It’s only fair, however, that we ask the objector what these three new mysteries are. Perhaps as a well-read intelligent person he’ll reply that mass, momentum and stress are all describable under general relativity as potentials. Continuing our inquiry, allowing the objector to share with us his greater knowledge, we ask him what potentials are. Potentials, he replies, are derived from intervals. Anticipating our next question, he explains that intervals are relations of events measurable by a ruler and a stopwatch. Perhaps we’re finally getting somewhere, we may think, but we must ask what it is that rulers and stopwatches consist of that does this measuring work. Or in other words, what are these measurements we’re calling intervals made of that allows them to build to our notion of matter? Quite simply, the tiring objector responds, we must know that they are pieces of matter designed with particular material specifications which we identify as measurements of space and time. Already he knows what the next question will be, and responds: “Yes, matter is the embodiment of mass, momentum and stress.” We’ve come full circle. When pressing to find the meaning of any physical term we encounter this situation, with this particular example being Eddington’s tailed pentagon. 1 The terms of physics are cyclic, forming a coherent and useful mesh through which we may describe items, but never yielding any sort of independence from the scheme which would be of any use in a quest to describe the nature of somethingness. When we press for description of matter, we’re continually presented with descriptions of the internal relations between different types of matter, yet never an external relation which would allow us to know what this general notion of matter is which the various examples are thought to have in common. Physics can describe specific things for us, but cannot describe thingness in general.

The only illustration of somethingness we can give is a point of the finger, and the explanation that no matter which way we point it remains necessarily accurate. Just as nothingness is exclusion, somethingness is lack of exclusion. Making use of that contrast, we may say that somethingness is that which it is not a mistake to imagine. Beyond its identification as a category which encompasses all things, the question of what somethingness means no longer makes sense. Somethingness has no description, although it consists in the totality of the universe of describable things. The class of all things describable is itself beyond description.


1: Eddington, A.S. (1928) The Nature of the Physical World. MacMillan, New York.

  1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10   11

Добавить в свой блог или на сайт

Похожие:

This text is free, but is still protected by U. S. and international copyright law. You are bound to these terms of usage iconOriginal text is copyright © 1997 by Suhrkamp Verlag. The text of this translation is copyright © 2001 Dennis Redmond

This text is free, but is still protected by U. S. and international copyright law. You are bound to these terms of usage iconLaw Modern constitutions The functions of government Initiative and referendum Law report The legal character of international law The law of negligence The death penalty Mathematics

This text is free, but is still protected by U. S. and international copyright law. You are bound to these terms of usage icon© This Report is the copyright of urs corporation Limited. Any unauthorised reproduction or usage by any person other than the addressee is strictly prohibited

This text is free, but is still protected by U. S. and international copyright law. You are bound to these terms of usage iconFree From Corporate America a tactical Guide to Success on Your Own Terms

This text is free, but is still protected by U. S. and international copyright law. You are bound to these terms of usage iconGlossary of Maritime Law Terms, 2nd Ed., 2004

This text is free, but is still protected by U. S. and international copyright law. You are bound to these terms of usage iconHigher school of economics
Хх century: natural law theories, sociological theories of law, legal positivism. Westphalia system and sovereignty. Communicative...

This text is free, but is still protected by U. S. and international copyright law. You are bound to these terms of usage iconThis electronic thesis is protected by the, Designs and Patents Act 1988. No reproduction is permitted without consent of the author. It is also protected by the Creative Commons Licence allowing Attributions-Non-commercial-No derivatives

This text is free, but is still protected by U. S. and international copyright law. You are bound to these terms of usage iconIntroduction This report covers developments in the field of ec international trade law during the six-month period from 1 January to 30 June 1997. 1 International Developments

This text is free, but is still protected by U. S. and international copyright law. You are bound to these terms of usage iconThis book is copyright of James George Whitelaw and is available free of charge for you to download and read in an electronic format. This book may not be

This text is free, but is still protected by U. S. and international copyright law. You are bound to these terms of usage iconD'Angelo Law Library New Acquisitions List September 2004 Law: Law in General, Comparative and Uniform Law, Jurisprudence


Разместите кнопку на своём сайте:
lib.convdocs.org


База данных защищена авторским правом ©lib.convdocs.org 2012
обратиться к администрации
lib.convdocs.org
Главная страница