1ac Contention 1: Inherency Current measures to protect our ports fail




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Название1ac Contention 1: Inherency Current measures to protect our ports fail
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1ac

Contention 1: Inherency

Current measures to protect our ports fail


Vesky, 2008 (Jonathan, Port and Maritime Security Pg 27-28)


A major concern for Congress is assessing whether the nation is doing enough and fast enough to deter a terrorist attack in the maritime domain. Despite the progress that has been made in strengthening port security thus far, many security officials still describe seaports as "wide open" and "very vulnerable" to terrorist attack.12 Seaports, along with air cargo, general aviation, and mass transit, were identified in a April 2003 GAO report as the "major vulnerabilities" remaining in the nation's transportation system. The GAO found that "an effective port security environment may be many years away." While many agree that CSI, C-TPAT, OSC, and MDA, are sound strategies for addressing the threat, they contend that these programs represent only a framework for building a maritime security regime, and that significant gaps in security still remain. In the words of one security expert,14

overseas point of origin.17 Finding the right balance between improving cargo security to desired levels without unduly impeding the legitimate flow of commerce is a difficult issue.


Current risk model for Port Security Grants needs to be reformed to more adequately reflect infrastructure

GAO, 11/11/2011 (“PORT SECURITY GRANT PROGRAM: Risk Model, Grant Management, and Effectiveness Measures Could Be Strengthened” United States Government Accountability Office http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-47)


Although FEMA has taken the first step towards improving how port vulnerability is measured in the PSGP risk model, further improvements are needed to ensure that the vulnerability score for a specific port is responsive to changes in security that may occur in that port—such as the implementation of new security measures. The fiscal year 2011 vulnerability index does not provide a mechanism to account for how new security measures—such as the installation of cameras or the provision of additional training to security officials —affect a port’s vulnerability, even if those security measures were funded using PSGP grant dollars. This limitation is due to the fact that the data elements within the vulnerability index are counts of activities, which recognize the number of activities that may occur—such as how many ferry passengers board a ferry—but do not account for the protective actions taken to secure them. For example, if a port installed security cameras throughout a ferry system to monitor vessel or ferry passenger activity, one would expect to reduce the ferry system’s vulnerability to attack. However, because the “ferry passenger” data element within the model’s vulnerability index is simply a count of passengers utilizing the ferry system and is not a reflection of the security measures in place to protect the ferry system, the new camera system would not reduce the port’s vulnerability score as calculated by the risk model. Thus, with this type of measure, in this example, a port could only reduce its vulnerability score by reducing the number of passengers utilizing the ferry system. The model’s robustness is thereby limited because activity counts do not reflect improvements made to port security. It is important to note that some security improvements may be captured by the inclusion of the Coast Guard’s Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model (MSRAM) results in the PSGP risk model.27 The MSRAM data— which are updated annually—provide information to the model on the percentage of national high-risk assets that reside within each port. However, MSRAM does not account for all types of security improvements because it is an asset-based model that assesses improvements to individual port assets such as a ferry terminal or a chemical plant. As such, MSRAM is not designed, for example, to evaluate security projects that may affect multiple assets in a port. The National Infrastructure Protection Plan states that when measuring vulnerability, one should describe all protective measures in place and how they reduce vulnerability. FEMA officials reported that capturing data on all security improvements would be challenging due to the need to collect and validate data for all ports included in the PSGP risk model. However, FEMA officials acknowledged the importance of incorporating completed security projects as part of the vulnerability component of the risk model and stated that FEMA will continue to refine its vulnerability assessments. Without accounting for the reductions in vulnerability achieved through new security measures implemented in a port, including those funded through the PSGP, the robustness of the risk model may be limited and not accurately reflect the relative risk of port areas throughout the nation. Instead, the risk model would likely continue to recognize the same ports as the highest risk, regardless of the security improvements made in those ports. In addition, by not accounting for security improvements resulting from PSGP grants, the security benefits of the PSGP are also not recognized. Incorporating completed security projects into the vulnerability component of the risk model could help increase its robustness and more accurately direct allocations to the highest risk port areas.


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